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This thesis analyzes the Army's Output Oriented
Resource Management System ( OORMS ) to evaluate its
effect on manpower management. OORMS was developed in
response to a need for a systematic feedback loop in
the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution System ( PPBES ) process. The system is
designed to provide feedback on execution in terms of
outputs achieved for inputs assigned in the PPBES.
This research focuses on the impact of OORMS on
manpower management in terms of the quality and
usefulness of the information provided and the workload
required to support the system. The study supports the
conclusion that OORMS, as currently developed, does not
support manpower management. Recommended actions to
improve the usefulness of OORMS are provided.
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The Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution System ( PPBES ) serves as the primary
management system within the Department of the Army to
ensure effective use of resources. In practice,
however, there has been a problem with linking together
each phase of the PPBES process. Specifically, the
Army has not been able to effectively track the
execution of its programs to evaluate the extent to
which planning, programming, and budgeting activities
are able to achieve desired results.
To improve the linkage between plans, programs,
budgets, and executions, the Army has recently
developed an Output Oriented Resource Management System
(OORMS). This system is designed to provide feedback
on execution in terms of outputs achieved for inputs
assigned in the PPBES. The analyses of OORMS data will
help identify and evaluate the impact of unforeseen
problems and provide feedback to the other phases of
PPBES. This information can be used to refine the
guidance, assumptions, and data that are used to
develop policies and forecast requirements.
Although OORMS has not yet been fully implemented,
it is valuable to analyze the design and operational
procedures to improve the PPBES process. Since
manpower is a critical resource, manpower managers play
a key part in the PPBES process. This study analyzes
the impact of OORMS on current Army manpower management
programs and manpower's role in the PPBES.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis analyzes OORMS to evaluate its effect
on manpower management. The system is examined to see
how it is related to the PPBES and to other manpower
management functions. A determination is made as to
whether OORMS will provide manpower staffs with the
data needed to perform their functions more
effectively. The study also investigates the
reporting requirements of OORMS and analyzes the
potential effects in terms of manpower management staff
workloads. When appropriate, recommended
modifications to the system are identified.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the research conducted, this study answers
the following questions:
(1) How will OORMS affect Army manpower management?
(2) How is OORMS related to the PPBES and to other
manpower management functions?
(3) Will OORMS add to the workload of manpower
management staffs?
(4) Will OORMS provide better and more accurateinformation?
(5) Will OORMS data enable manpower managers to
make better decisions?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1 . Scope
Although OORMS is a resource management system
that includes both dollars and manpower, this thesis
focuses only on the manpower aspects. Undoubtedly,
OORMS will require interface between manpower staffs,
program budget personnel , and finance and accounting
staffs to meet the reporting requirements. This
research addresses only those interfaces that affect
manpower management.
This thesis does not attempt to evaluate OORMS
in terms of monetary costs vs. benefits. No data were
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collected on the costs associated with developing,
implementing and maintaining OORMS. Moreover, the





The 1986 Department of Defense (DOD)
Authorization Act directed that the President submit a
two-year budget proposal to Congress beginning with
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989. As a result, significant
changes are occurring in the DOD Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System ( PPBS ) and the Army PPBES. Since
many of the procedural changes implementing biennial
DOD PPBS and Army PPBES have not been developed or
refined, this thesis is based on the former annual
system. This limitation will not adversely affect the
purpose and outcome of this research.
Since OORMS is still in the late development
and early implementation stages, there are little data
on the actual execution of the system. Therefore, it
is difficult to predict, with any certainty, the
ultimate effects of OORMS on current Army programs.
However, it is possible to analyze the design and
proposed operating procedures of OORMS to verify the
inclusion of essential elements. This study provides
the necessary analysis to make a preliminary evaluation
of OORMS
3 . Assumptions
The assumptions of this thesis are as follows:
(1) That the reader is familiar with the Army PPBES
process
.
(2) That OORMS is the only Army initiative todevelop a feedback loop in the PPBES process.
E . METHODOLOGY
This research basically involves a policy analysis
of OORMS. It includes an investigation of OORMS, its
interfaces with current PPBES and manpower management
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systems, and an analysis of the impact of OORMS on
these systems. Telephone and personal interviews were
conducted with key manpower and OORMS personnel to
obtain additional information, opinions, and ideas on
OORMS. In addition, a thorough review was made of
Army, GAO , OORMS, and other appropriate documentation.
The data for this analysis were obtained from a
number of sources, including:
(1) Army regulations, guidance, and policy documents
(2) Prior Army and GAO audit reports and studies
(3) OORMS documentation
(4) Telephone and personal interviews with Army
personnel currently or formerly assigned to
manpower management and/or OORMS support duties.
There was an abundance of information available on the
deficiencies of the current PPBES and related manpower
management systems. There were also adequate data on
the theoretical processes of OORMS.
However, there was some difficulty gathering
information on the practical application of OORMS.
Since the system is still in the late stages of
development and only certain segments of the total
system are currently being implemented, there were
little data on the actual experiences with OORMS.
Secondly, since OORMS was developed at the HQDA level,
with limited input from installations, it was difficult
to obtain sufficient information on the use of OORMS
data at installations. A third factor that caused
problems was the history of insufficient coordination
with manpower personnel on OORMS. Manpower
organizations know relatively little about OORMS,
particularly at the installation level.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Appendix A contains a glossary of terms and
Appendix B identifies acronyms and abbreviations used
in this thesis.
12
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized as follows: Chapter II is
a review of literature highlighting important issues in
current Army PPBES and manpower management systems.
Chapter III provides a brief discussion of specific
background issues that have led to the development of
OORMS. Chapter IV describes the PPBES, the current
manpower management process and the relationships
between the two systems. Chapter V provides a
description of OORMS and the role of manpower in OORMS.
Chapter VI analyzes the impact of OORMS on manpower
management and manpower's role in the PPBES. The
potential benefits and problem areas are also
discussed. Chapter VII summarizes the thesis, provides
conclusions, and makes recommendations.
13
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Army's systems for managing financial and
manpower resources have been criticized. Specifically,
the Army has been cited for deficiencies in its system
for determining manpower requirements and for its
inability to provide reliable, consistent data on
actual accomplishments during the execution of its
programs. [Ref. 1]
In 1979, the GAO reported that the Army did not
have a credible system for determining manpower
requirements for support and administrative functions
at Army installations. GAO found that requirements
were based on appraisals by manpower survey teams [Ref.
2]. However, surveys were not coordinated with other
major manpower management activities, such as PPBES,
allocation of manpower resources to organizational
units, and evaluation of manpower use. In addition,
the Army was not able to quantify the impact of not
receiving the survey requirements and was not able to
accurately predict future manpower needs [Ref. 2:p. 9].
The GAO study found that the manpower survey
program was not designed to provide input to the
budget. Survey teams established manpower requirements
by organizational element, while the Army budgets by
activity or function. As a result, the survey findings
were in a form that was incompatible with PPBES
formats. Furthermore, there were no procedures for
relating work center requirements to program changes in
the budget.
GAO recommended that the Army develop an improved
manpower management system. Specifically, the Army was
advised to:
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(1) Standardize the manpower management
organizational structures at all levels.
(2) Design and implement a manpower requirements
system that includes staffing standards
developed through work measurement techniques and
methods studies.
(3) Assure that the standards enable tying manpower
requirements to budget requests.
(4) Develop a management information system that uses
a common data base for work center needs
.
garrison costs, budget requests, allocations, and
evaluations of manpower use. [Ref. 2:p. 35]
A 1979 GAO report identified other weaknesses in
the Army's manpower management systems. One problem
cited was the lack of a common data base for
coordinating, budgeting, and evaluating manpower needs.
Also, poor control and feedback led to difficulties in
justifying manpower requirements and quantifying the
impact of staff shortages. The report stated that the
Army lacked "the capability to aggregate requirements
from the detail level to the budget level; directly
relate manpower to workload; trace budget changes to
the work center level; and evaluate manpower use with a
common data base." [Ref. 3:p. 9]
GAO recommended that the Army develop a manpower
management system which was integrated at all
organizational levels. The system should allow all
functions to be tied together with common data bases
and simple reporting systems that can meet manpower and
budgeting needs at all levels. [Ref. 3:p. 40]
In 1986, the House Committee on Armed Services
requested that GAO conduct a comprehensive analysis of
defense manpower requirements programs. GAO '
s
assessment of the Army's programs was limited because
the Army was in the midst of a major overhaul in its
manpower requirements determination system. In
response to the 1979 GAO criticisms, the Army was
developing a Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3).
GAO indicated in the 1986 review that the Army's plans
15
for this system were highly responsive to previous
recommendations. However, the Army planned to continue
its previous manpower requirements determination
programs until MS-3 was in place. To the extent the
Army continued to use previous methods, GAO concerns
identified in the 1979 reports were still relevant.
[Ref. 4:p. 10]
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been repeatedly
criticized by Congress and other parties for the lack
of accountability in the execution of its programs.
Budgeting, accounting and related management
information systems often produce data that are
inconsistent and irreconcilable. Financial reports
focus on the obligations, outlays, and manhours
expended by appropriation and do not provide a reliable
measure of the resources being consumed to carry out
identified programs. This lack of accountability has
weakened DOD ' s position in defending its budget before
Congress. [Ref. l:p. 93]
In 1979, a study was sponsored by the U.S. Army War
College Military Studies Program to determine how
manpower should be managed at Continental United States
(CONUS) installations. As a part of the study,
interviews were conducted with various key personnel
involved in manpower management throughout the Army.
One issue that repeatedly surfaced during the
interviews was the quality of manpower reporting
systems. [Ref. 5]
In general, the manpower management community felt
the manpower reporting systems were of little or no
value to installations. The reports were too lengthy,
too complicated and time consuming. Similar data
appeared on various reports signifying duplication of
effort and redundancy. In spite of the excessive
effort put into the report, it was expressed by
16
manpower staff members that useful audit trails for
manpower have been essentially nonexistent. There was
a recognized need for a streamlined and simplified
reporting system and standardization of reports.
GAO reviewed the DOD budget in 1983 to determine
how it is planned and how resources are expended.
Although it was felt that the services were generally
spending as they planned, GAO concluded that there was
a need for more accountability. The study recommended
that DOD provide expected and measurable program
outcomes during budget requests and report on progress
made toward attaining prior year expectations. GAO
also felt DOD should develop a method of linking
anticipated improvements in military capability to
increased levels of resources. [Ref. 6]
In 1985, GAO looked at the role of automated
management information systems in defense force
management. The study identified a number of










Lack of systems integration.
Lack of systems responsiveness.
Lack of software maintenance.
Inadequate software documentation.
Poor data integrity.
Inadequate training of computer personnel
Use ^of^outmode.d computer equipment.
Ref. 7:p. 11]
These problems were affecting the quality of the force
management decisions that the systems supported.
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III. BACKGROUND
The Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System ( PPBS ) is the overall management system which
annually presents to the President and Congress, the
resource requirements for the Department of Defense
( DOD ) . Until the early 1980s, the Army also operated
under this three-phase PPBS process. There was growing
recognition, however, that PPBS a clear focus on the
execution end of the process. Early in the Fiscal Year
(FY) 1984-88 cycle, the Army added the Execution phase
to the PPBS, thereby renaming its primary resource
management system the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution System ( PPBES ) . [Ref. 8:p. 9]
The objectives of PPBES are as follows:
(1) To reflect the national military strategy in
sizing, structuring, and manning the Army force.
(2) To obtain required forces, manpower, and dollars.
(3) To allocate forces, manpower, dollars, and
available materiel and equipment among competing
demands according to Army resource allocation
policy and priorities.
(4) To evaluate how well execution of the program andbudget applies resources to achieve intended
purposes and adjust resource requirements based
on execution feedback. [Ref. 9:p. 4]
Army manpower is an important component of the
PPBES. The objective of manpower management is to
properly man the forces in support of national security
missions. To accomplish this objective, manpower
management must:
(1) Identify manpower requirements.
(2) Allocate scarce manpower resources withinpredetermined priorities.
(3) Man the force structure. [Ref. 10:p. 3]
The determination of manpower requirements extends
to the justification of these requirements in the PPBES
and the allocation of available authorizations against
18
requirements. An effective manpower management program
requires timely documentation and control through data
reporting systems. These systems must maintain an
audit trial of manpower use and provide feedback on
execution of programs. [Ref. 10:p. 3]
In practice, some critics allege the PPBES and
manpower management processes have not been able to
adequately assess execution. Ted Cooper described the
PPBES problem as follows:
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution
System is deficient in that it does not provide
meaningful feedback to decision makers on program
lerformance. Decision makers decide to do something
plan) and then determine exactly what to do
program) and then determine specific cost (budget),
'he contention is that after the budget is finished,
the DA Staff goes back to plan or program and start
the cycle over again without any meaningful feedback





, was the workload that was
financed actually accomplished? [Ref. 11: p. 4]
The PPBES was been allowed to exist without a
systematic feedback loop--the essential step to
evaluate the quality of resource decisions and to
improve the quality of future decision making [Ref.
12 :p. 6]. Dallas Lower looked at Army management of
program execution in 1981. He found that the Army
accounting system was not capable of providing data
which were pertinent to an evaluation of program
execution. The cost data were structured along
appropriation lines, not by programs. At that time,
research was underway to find more meaningful ways of
collecting and extracting data and using the results as
feedback for future PPBES cycles. [Ref. 4:p. 96]
As a major effort to correct the deficiencies in
the PPBES, the Army introduced plans in 1984 to develop
an Output Oriented Resource Management System (OORMS).
This system was expected to help close the loop in the
PPBES. OORMS was being designed to provide feedback on
execution in terms of outputs achieved for inputs
planned, programmed, budgeted, and then used.
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In 1985, Barry Baer analyzed the Army's PPBES
problem of Inadequate feedback to decision makers on
program performance and evaluated the capability of
OORMS to correct the problem. He recognized the need
for a financial management structure that would include
performance information that can be used for both day-
to-day management and policy and budgeting decisions.
This system would require:
(1) Agreement in relevant measures of accomplishment(performance factors).
(2) A systematic collection of reliable, consistent,
and comparable information on costs and
accompl ishments
.
(3) That the information be routinely supplied for
use in management, planning, programming, and
budgeting. [Ref. ll:p. 1]
Baer recommended the implementation of the OORMS
process to improve the Army's PPBES and to focus
attention on the relationship of resources to outputs.
OORMS would use microcomputers and diskettes to
transmit information between HQDA , Major Commands
(MACOMs), and Major Subordinate Commands
(MSCs )/installations . The data in OORMS, taken from
standard Army financial systems, would provide the
information necessary to evaluate whether input
resources achieved the desired outputs.
OORMS is currently in the late development and
early implementation stages. When fully operational,
OORMS is expected to provide:
(1) The key events of the Army's PPBES.
(2) More time for analysis and review through
reduction in preparation time.
(3) Linkages of accounting (financial data),
manpower, and output data with program/budget
data—vertically through commands and
horizontally across commands
.
[Ref . 13:p. 2-3]
OORMS is supposed to give resource managers trackable,
auditable, and consistent information about the




The critical element of output achieved for
resources consumed is an added dimension that currently
is not readily available to Army resource managers.
For manpower managers, output data are of particular
interest. OORMS promises to provide outputs produced
or workload accomplished for manhours expended. This
information is fundamental in the determination of
manpower requirements and in the evaluation of manpower
utilization. Furthermore, the key identification of
resources to outputs will be an essential baseline for
evaluating the effectiveness of productivity
enhancement programs throughout the Army.
Manpower management staffs at all levels are
currently challenged with many responsibilities in
performing their duties. OORMS is intended to simplify
and reduce the burden associated with producing the
basic products involved with manpower management. This
new system promises to improve the quality of manpower
input to the PPBES; it is not intended to be another
stovepipe system that only adds to the workload of
manpower staffs.
In view of the many criticisms the Army has
received on its inadequate manpower management
programs, it is important to evaluate the potential
impact of OORMS on manpower management. Since OORMS has
not yet been fully implemented, there has been little
research conducted on the system except for
descriptions of its theoretical processes. To date,
there has been no available analysis of the impact of
OORMS on the manpower community, particularly at the
installation level.
Several benefits should be realized from this
research. One benefit of this analysis is that it will
provide insight into the expected impact of OORMS on
manpower management within the Army. This information
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can help manpower managers understand how OORMS will
change the way they perform their operations and how to
get the maximum benefits from it.
A second benefit is that the study may enhance the
coordination between the manpower, program/budget, and
financial management communities. Since most budget
systems are developed for, and managed by, the
financial side of resource management, there is a
tendency for inadequate coordination with the manpower
side .
This research may also lead to the identification
of needed modifications in OORMS that would enhance its
benefits to manpower management. Since some of the
OORMS components are still under development, minor
changes could be relatively easy to implement.
Furthermore, if there are major problems with OORMS
that would prevent achievement of its objectives, it
would be better to identify them before the system is
fully operational. It is important to determine
whether OORMS will improve manpower management and the
PPBES process, or create new problems for the program.
22
IV. PPBES AND MANPOWER MANAGEMENT
A. DESCRIPTION OF PPBES
1. The POD PPBS
The parent system of the Army's PPBES is the
DOD PPBS. The PPBS is the overall management system
used to plan, program, and budget for DOD resources.
It provides a framework for making decisions on the use
of resources to accomplish specific objectives in
national defense. Through the PPBS, the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) and the Secretaries of individual
service branches provide policy and guidance on force
levels and manpower and fiscal constraints. The SECDEF
also uses the PPBS to issue decisions on defense
programs and to budget annual funds to support the
programs. [Ref. 14:p. 45]
The official summary of the programs developed
in the PPBS and approved by the SECDEF is published in
the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP
documents the manpower and dollar resource requirements
associated with the approved programs of all military
departments and defense agencies. Manpower and dollar
resources are reflected for the prior fiscal year,
current fiscal year, two budget years, and three
subsequent fiscal years. Force levels are presented
for the prior fiscal year, current year, two budget
years, and six subsequent years.
The FYDP structure contains 11 major defense
programs as shown in Table 1. Each program is
subdivided into program elements or subprograms. Each
subprogram with its personnel, equipment, and
facilities makes up an identifiable military
capability. [Ref. 14:p. 14-5]
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TABLE 1
ELEVEN MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Program 1 Strategic Forces
Program 2 General Purpose Forces
Program 3 Intelligence and Communications
Program 4 Air 1 if t /Seal if
t
Program 5 Guard and Reserve Forces
Program 6 Research and Development
Program 7 Central Supply and Maintenance
Program 8 Training, Medical and Other General
Personnel Activities
Program 9 Administration and Associated
Activities
Program 10 Support of Other Nations
Program 11 Special Operations Forces
(Ref. 15)
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While DOD programs in terms of the 11 major
programs and associated subprograms, the budget request
submitted to Congress are structured along
appropriation lines. Table 2 reflects the major
appropriation categories. To meet the needs of both
DOD (output oriented) and Congress (input oriented) the
FYDP has the capability to provide a crosswalk between
the program elements and appropriations. [Ref. 15 :p.
14-5] To obtain this capability, the services must
format their manpower and dollar resource inputs by
both program element and appropriation.
The FYDP is updated three times each year. The
first update occurs in January to reflect resource
levels in the President's budget submission to
Congress. The second update is made in May following
the submission of each defense component's Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The third update follows
the submission of Service Budget Estimates to OSD in
September
.
The Defense Resources Board ( DRB ) assists the
SECDEF in managing the PPBS process. In this role, the
DRB:
(1) Reviews proposed policy, planning, and
programming guidance.
(2) Conducts the program and budget review.
(3) Evaluates high priority programs.
(4) Ensures that major acquisition programs align
with the PPBS.
(5) Advises the SECDEF on policy, PPBS issues, and
proposed decisions. [Ref. 9:p. 4]
2. Overview of PPBES
The PPBES is the primary management system used
by the Army to ensure effective use of resources to
accomplish its roles and missions. It differs from the
DOD PPBS by formally including program and budget






Procurement (Aircraft, missiles, weapons &
tracked vehicles, ammunition and other)
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Military Construction




Linking to the OSD programming and budgeting processes,
the PPBES develops and maintains the Army section of
the FYDP and defense budget. [Ref. 9: p. 4]
The PPBES supports budget preparation from
installation to Army staff level. Furthermore, the
documents produced in the PPBES process help support
defense decisionmaking. For example, the Army helps
prepare the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) as
well as the Defense Guidance ( DG ) for department
planning, programming, and budgeting. The Army's
participation influences policy, strategy, and force
objectives considered by the SECDEF and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS). [Ref. 9:p. 4]
The PPBES is structured to allocate program and
budget resources to products described by Management
Decision Packages (MDEPs), which together establish
Army force capability. The MDEPs are distributed among
five discrete management areas as follows:
(1) Missions of tables or organization and equipment(TOE) units.
(2) Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of
systems
.
(3) Activities of the support and mobilization base.
(4) Operations of Army installations.
(5) Special functional areas (packages that cut
across two or more management areas).
[Ref. 9:p. 4J
MDEPs have two components. The first is a
Program Development Increment Package (PDIP) that
covers the five program years and helps build the Army
program. The PDIP identifies an individual program or
capability and links it to the resources needed to
accomplish it. PDIPs are the building blocks of the
Army POM and help with the prioritization of limited
resources. They provide visibility to individual
programs which allows decisionmakers to select how to
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spend limited force structure, manpower, and dollar
resources. [Ref. 15]
The second component of the MDEP is a Budget
Increment Package (BIP). The BIP is similar to the
PDIP, but covers the prior fiscal year, current fiscal
year, and budget fiscal year. Figure 4.1 illustrates
an MDEP applicable to the FY 1988-1992 PPBES cycle.
The PDIP and BIP complement each other in
format and substance. The PDIP applies to programmed
resources and the BIP records budgeted or actually
executed resources. Together, the PDIP and the BIP
allow both programmers and budgeters at all levels to
see the manpower and dollars required to produce a
given program output.
Although the PDIP and BIP are similar, they
each differ in purpose and fiscal years. As a result,
each has its own language. The flexibility for
managing funds differs greatly between the programming
and budgeting phases. Before the President's budget is
submitted to Congress, the Army has significant freedom
with the PDIP to realign resources among
appropriations. After the budget goes to Congress,
however, restrictions imposed by the Administration and
Congress severely limit the Army's ability to realign
within the BIP. [Ref. 9:p. 4] Therefore, the PDIP
serves as a flexible Army tool useful in programming,
while the BIP reflects rigid congressionally
appropriated funds for a specific PDIP.
[Ref. 8:p. 9]
The PPBES has four formal phases. Three of the
phases correspond to the DOD PPBS: planning,
programming, and budgeting. The fourth, execution, is
a distinct system phase for only the Army. The PPBES
cycles, as well as the four phases within each cycle,
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the relationships between PPBES phases. The next
sections explain each of the four phases.
3. Planning
Army planning supports the DOD PPBS and JCS
strategic planning. It contributes to the military-
strategy, advice, and recommendations the JCS give the
SECDEF and the President through the Joint Strategic
Planning System.
Army planning examines national objectives and enemy
capabilities; identifies the military strategy needed
to maintain national security and support U.S.
foreign policy; determines what integrated and
balanced military forces are needed to support that
strategy; and establishes a basis for managing DOD
resources effectively and efficiently to accomplish
its missions, consistent with resource constraints.
[Ref. 15:p. 14-9]
There are three phases to Army planning.
During the first phase, Force Requirements Planning,
the Army staff translates defense policies and
objectives into Army terms. Army planners use this
information, along with Army long range plans, and
other current studies and issues, to determine
relatively unconstrained requirements for Army forces
to achieve national objectives. [Ref. 9:p. 6] The
analyses conducted in this phase are documented in the
Army submission to the JSPS to help planners build the
planning force. Table 3 outlines the concepts
distinguishing the types of forces developed in force
planning and programming.
The second planning phase involves Objectives
Planning, where the Army considers the projected
availability of resources. It evaluates alternatives
for allocating resources by applying a process called
macroanalysis . Macroanalysis constructs candidate
force alternatives that differ in the levels of
resources applied to Army functions. This process
allows decisionmakers to develop and review affordable
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Objectives planning uses a force development
process called Total Army Analysis ( TAA ) . For each POM
year, TAA develops a proposed program force that can
best meet the projected mission, given anticipated
resource limits. TAA also specifies the objective
force requirements for a 10-year extended period beyond
the POM. [Ref. 9: p. 7]
Planning Documentation is the third phase,
ending with the publication of The Army Plan (TAP). The
objective force alternatives are presented to the Army
leadership for decision. The objective force selected
and approved is published in the draft TAP and is
considered at the Army Commander's Conference.
Following the Commander's Conference, the TAP is
finalized and presented to the Chief of Staff, Army
(CSA) and Secretary of the Army ( SA ) for the final
approval. [Ref. 9:p. 7]
The TAP is published as part of the Army
Guidance (AG) to bridge the gap between planning and
programming and guide development of the POM. The Army
Plan provides Army leadership policy and resource
guidance to support the Army's mission. It also
establishes priorities for allocating both manpower and
dollar resources. [Ref. 15]
4 . Programming
During the programming phase of the PPBES , the
Army uses the planning decisions and OSD programming
guidance to develop a comprehensive and detailed
allocation of forces, manpower, and dollars for a five
year period. HQDA maintains a data base in the PPBES
Data Management System (PROBE) to help build and manage
the Army program. This results in the Army's POM,
reflecting the Army's proposal for a balanced
allocation of its resources within specified
constraints. It contains the forces, manpower,
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training, materiel acquisition, and logistics support
required to meet the Army's objectives. [Ref. 15] The
POM, as approved by the SECDEF is the basis for
developing the Army Budget Estimates Submission ( BES
)
[Ref. 9].
A second document resulting from the Army
programming is the Extended Planning Annex (EPA). As an
annex to the POM, the EPA extends for ten years beyond
the five-year POM program. It presents the materiel
acquisition profile for selected major systems and
projects operating and support costs in terms of force
structure, manpower, and military construction. [Ref.
15:p. 14-10]
A number of documents provide guidance for
developing the POM. The DG, developed during the
planning phase, provides the SECDEF' s programming
direction. Army Guidance is also issued to the Army
Staff, MACOMs , and Operating Agencies. It consists of
four volumes.
Volume I is The Army Plan. Volume II documents
program development procedures and includes
instructions to MACOMs for preparing their Program
Analysis Resource Review (PARR) and Modernization
Resource Information Submission (MRIS). The PARR
describes the resource requirements of MACOMs and
Operating Agencies to undertake new initiatives and to
increase or decrease support for existing programs.
[Ref. 9:p. 8] It is used by Army organizations to
cost, in detail, the major program issues [Ref. l:p.
37]. The MRIS identifies MACOM operations and support
requirements (e.g., repair parts, tools, military
construction) needed to support the fielding and
sustainment of new and displaced equipment. Volume III
of the Army Guidance provides DA-directed PDIPs for
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MACOM assistance in costing. Volume IV forwards OSD
instructions for preparing the POM.
Another document provided by HQDA is the
Program and Budget Guidance (PBG). The PBG forwards
resource guidance (manpower and dollars) to
MACOMs/ Operating Agencies three times a year. The PBG
published in February reflects the President's budget
and establishes the base used In Army POM development.
It also documents the current fiscal year resource
levels approved by Congress. The May PBG reflects the
levels of resources submitted to OSD in the POM and
provides MACOMs a formal reply to their PARR
submissions. The October PBG is based on the OSD
budget submission and provides guidance for preparing
the PARR. [Ref. 15:p. 14-11]
Three additional sources of programming
guidance are the FYDP annexes, the Long Range Research,
Development and Acquisition Plan (LRRDAP), and
Acquisition Reviews. The FYDP annexes provide resource
guidance for procurement, construction, and Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE). The LRRDAP
describes the strategy and specific programs for
research, development, and acquisition based on the
goals and objectives contained in the TAP. The annual
Acquisition Reviews incorporate budgeting and
programming for RDTE and procurement. A key result of
the reviews is the identification of RDTE and
procurement POM-to-budget issues. [Ref. 9: p. 8]
The Army has established nine functional areas
to build the Army program. Table 4 presents the nine
functional areas currently used. All competing PDIPs
are assigned to one of the nine areas. Army staff
functional area proponents establish nine corresponding
panels to rank order all assigned PDIPs. Each
functional area is assigned manpower and dollar
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TABLE 4
NINE ARMY FUNCTIONAL AREAS








MOBILIZING AND DEPLOYING Preparations prior to
M-Day to enable the
forces to expand in the
event of war or other
national emergency













EQUIPPING Includes all research,
development and
acquisition activities
SUSTAINING CONUS base support and
logistics base in
support of the existing
force







ceilings. As a result, some PDIPS are unresourced,
while others near the margin are considered at risk.
The prioritized lists of resourced and at-risk
PDIPs in each functional area become the initial POM
base. After undergoing a functional review by Army-
staff committees, decisions are made as to which PDIPs
will get resourced, which will be at risk, and which
will be unresourced. Upon approval by the CSA and the
SA , the final decisions are locked into the Army POM
and submitted to OSD.
Each Service POM is reviewed by the JCS for the
overall balance of the force and impact on national
military strategy. This review is published in the
Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). The JPAM
provides an overall risk assessment of the POMs . [Ref.
15:p. 14-4]
OSD reviews the POMs and the JPAM and identifies
alternatives for those issues where OSD differs from
the Service. These issues are assembled into Issue
Books. Issue Books formally evaluate POM proposals as
they relate to policy and planning guidance; address
the balance between readiness, sustainabil ity
,
modernization, and force structure; define issues and
list alternatives; evaluate capabilities and costs of
the alternatives. [Ref. 9:p. 9]
After receiving comments from the Service, OSD
sends the Issue Books to the DRB for review and
decision. The formal reply to the POM submission is
furnished by OSD through the Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM). The PDM approves the POM with
necessary changes and provides the basis for the budget
submission. [Ref. 9:p. 9]
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5 . Budgeting
During the programming phase, Army plans are
translated into a balanced allocation of forces,
manpower, materiel, and dollars for five years.
Budgeting translates these requirements to manpower and
dollar needs by Congressional appropriation category,
emphasizing the first two years of the five-year
program. [Ref. 15: p. 14-15] Army budgeting proceeds
in three stages: formulation; negotiation and
justification; and execution.
Budget formulation converts the first year of
the approved PDM into Army Budget Estimates. During
this process, the Army validates POM pricing and
executabil i ty assumptions [Ref. 9: p. 11]. MACOMs and
installations provide input through the Command
Operating Budget (COB) submission. The COB reflects
resource decisions made during POM development as
published in the May PBG. MACOM COBs provide detailed
budget and workload data on their command operating
programs to help appropriation sponsors develop and
defend budget estimates. The COB gives information for
the prior year, current year, budget year, and the
first program year. [Ref. 15:p. 14-16] Budget
submissions paralleling the COB apply to RDTE
,
procurement and military appropriations, as well as for
the National Guard and Reserve appropriations.
[Ref. 9:p.9]
Upon approval of the Budget estimates by the
CSA and SA , the BES is submitted to OSD. Analysts from
OSD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
review the BES. Alternatives to the Army proposal are
developed and forwarded to the Army in a Program Budget
Decision ( PBD ) . The finalized Army budget is
integrated into the total DOD budget and submitted in
the President's Budget to Congress.
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The second stage of budgeting, negotiation and
Justification, is centered on congressional review of
the President's budget and the programs it supports.
The review involves three separate but related
processes: congressional budget, program authorization,
and financial appropriations. First, the House and
Senate Budget Committees prepare a congressional budget
that establishes targets for outlays and budget
authority. After receiving approval from both Houses,
the congressional budget guides the program
authorization and financial appropriations process.
[Ref. 9: p. 11]
The congressional authorization process sets
the upper limits of program authorization for Army
programs. Prepared at the Budget Line Item level, it
establishes the limits for each line of the budget
request in quantity and dollars. The House and Senate
Armed Services Committees exercise primary cognizance
of defense authorizations. [Ref. 9:p. 11]
The appropriations process establishes the
final limits on the funds available to the Army for the
next fiscal year. Appropriations may not exceed the
levels set in the authorization act and usually fund
less than the full amount of the authorized program.
[Ref. 9: p. 11]
During budget negotiation and justification,
the Army provides detailed justification books to the
Armed Services and appropriation committees. These
committees hold formal hearings to discuss the issues
in the budget submission. When the congressional
reviews are completed, the committee bills are voted
on. Any differences between the House and Senate are
resolved in a joint conference. Upon approval by both
Houses, the appropriation bills are sent to the
President for signature. Army appropriations then
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become lav. providing the legal authority to incur
obligations and Make disbursements. [Ref. I5:p. 1-4-1"]
6 . Execution
The last stage of budgeting. execution, has
been designated a distinct and separate :::ase in the
??3IS. Budget execution includes apportioning,
allocating. and allotting funds: obligating and
disbursing them: and reporting and review.
Apportionments. distributed by OMB, authorize the
obligation of funds in specified amounts and for
specified periods and functions. Allocations of
apportioned funds are made to Operating Agencies by the
U.S. Amy Finance and Accounting Center. Operating
Agencies then make funds available to subordinate
organizations by an allotment. These organizations
obligate funds when placing orders or avarding
contracts for products and services needed to carry out
approved programs. Disbursements are made after
deliveries of materiel or services occur.
iRef. 9: p. 11]
Since the services are held accountable for the
execution of their programs, the CSA has established a
Program Performance and Budget Execution Reviev System
V ??3ZRS^. This quarterly reviev reports and evaluates
how well resources are being applied to accomplish Army
goals. The areas reviewed include Manpower programs.
major materiel systems and selected non-materiel
programs of special interest. ??BIRS compares actual
program performance at YDI? level with the objectives
established in the BIP at the beginning of the year.
If necessary. corrective action is taken to improve
program accomplishment. ~Ref. 15]
Accounting support is very important in
obtaining feedback fr:~. execution. The accounting
function collects data for actual apportionments.
40
obligations, and outlays. These data provide
historical information to help develop future budgets
and make current decisions on expenditures.
B. MANPOWER AND FORCE MANAGEMENT
1 . General
AR 570-4, Manpower Management
,
[Ref. 10]
states that the "objective of Army manpower management
is to properly man Army forces in support of national
security missions." Within the PPBES process, the Army
must design the force, identify the corresponding
manpower requirements, and then allocate the limited
manpower resources. The force management process
develops the detailed design of the Army's elements and
its total structure. The manpower program implements
and supports that design. Manpower management involves
obtaining and allocating the manpower spaces required
to build the force structure.
The force management process is the overall
operation through which the tables of organization and
equipment (TOE), modification tables of organization
and equipment (MTOE), and tables of distribution and
allowances ( TDA ) units are planned, developed, and
programmed into the force structure. This DOD process
runs concurrent and parallel with the PPBES but has its
own distinct phases.
Manpower and force management consists of four
activities which parallel the PPBES: Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Authorization Management.
Planning begins with threat analysis and ends with a
definition of the detailed planning force structure to
support POM development. The programming phase
coincides with the POM and identifies the level of
resources required to man the program force reflected
in the POM and FYDP. Budgeting converts manpower
requirements for the program force into requests for
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end strength authorization. Authorization management
begins with each FYDP update of programming and
budgeting, proceeds through the Army standards and
requirements determination process, and ends with the
analysis and utilization process. [Ref. 16]
2. Force Planning
Force planning is an essential element in the
force management process which determines the Army's
needs in gross numbers of major organizations. As
demonstrated in Figure 4.3, it begins with the
contingency planning system and ends with the
determination of an objective force. In contingency
planning, a minimum risk force (MRF) is developed by
the JCS based on an analysis of the threat. The MRF
identifies the force capabilities required to provide a
high assurance of successfully supporting the military
strategy. This force is fully structured and
supported, unconstrained by manpower, equipment, or
dollar resources.
As constraints are applied through the Defense
Guidance, a more affordable and realistic planning
force is designed. The planning force is capable of
supporting the strategy but with some level of risk.
Since its requirements still exceed available peacetime
defense resources, the planning force serves as a
baseline for establishing priorities in allocating
program resources and assessing the allocated risk.
The objective force is the end product of force
planning. This force, with even more constraints
imposed on its design, focuses on the year of the
current POM and is used as a realistic goal in the
later development of the program force. The objective
force presents the macro level (division) force









Figure 4.3 Force Planning (Ref. 16)
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basis for the development of force structure guidance
contained in The Army Plan. [Ref. 16]
The transition from force planning to
programming involves a force development process.
Figure 4.4 shows that force development takes the
objective force through the TAA process and results in
the POM Base Case. Force structure development in the
TAA process involves the "derivation of the Army
program force structure through an analysis of the
national military strategy, potential threats, doctrine
and available or projected resources." [Ref. 16] The
force development process is designed to:
(1) Specify the force structure for each program
year .
(2) Provide the basis for adjusting the force
structure to meet program constraints.
(3) Assess force capabilities, deficiencies, and
r isk
.
(4) Assist in the transition of the proposed force
structure to the POM. [Ref. 16]
3 . Force Programming
Force programming takes the POM Base Case
through the PPBES cycle and results in the POM program
force included in the Army POM submitted to OSD
(Figure 4.5). The force resulting from the TAA process
becomes the initial program force and serves as the
basis for development of the Army POM. During the
process of prioritizing PDIP's, the Army staff
determines which structure programs will be included in
the POM. Consideration is given to strength guidance,
recruiting capabilities, retention policies, and HODA
program initiatives.
MACOMs and Operating Agencies input their
changes in manpower requirements through a POM
assessment letter and the PARR submission. [Ref. 10]
Upon final approval by the CSA and SA , the POM program









































Figure 4.5 Force Programming (Ref. 16)
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through which the Army requests funding from OSD to




During the budgeting phase, the manpower
requirements for the program force are translated into
requests for end strength authorizations. In addition,
justification is provided to support appropriations and
defend budget requests. The COB is used to analyze,
manage, and implement manpower authorizations in the
Army budget formulation process. It provides detailed
information for use by manpower managers and
appropriation directors in developing and evaluating
budget estimates. The manpower data in the COB are
used to help support the Budget Estimate Submission to
OSD and defend budget requests to OMB and Congress.
5 . Authorization Management
Authorization management consists of several
processes which are the responsibility of manpower
managers. AR 570-4 lists five specific manpower
management functions that are required to properly man
the Army force structure. These functions are listed
in Table 5.
a. Requirements Determination
The requirements determination function
involves the identification of the minimum number and
types of personnel needed to accomplish valid mission
responsibilities. Manpower requirements are to be
based on the most effective and efficient organization.
Several tools are used in the requirements
determination
.
The Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-
3) is used for functional areas in TDA organizations
where manpower requirements are workload driven.
Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) are used for TOE





* Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
* Documentation
* Allocation
* Analysis and Evaluation
(Ref. 10)
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Manpower surveys and staffing guides are used for
organizational or functional areas in TDA functions
where manpower requirements are not workload driven,
where standards have not yet been developed, or where
unique organizations exist. [Ref. 10:p. 4]
b. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
The second function given manpower managers
is planning, programming, and budgeting. Planning
involves the structuring of Army forces within
established manpower constraints to accomplish national
strategic goals. This includes peacetime maintenance
and contingency and mobilization capabilities.
Programming involves the allocation of manpower
throughout the years of the FYDP to support a given
force structure. Budgeting includes the request,
appropriation, allocation, and management of manpower
resources. [Ref. 10]
c. Documentation
Another manpower management function is
documentation. Each Army unit has its mission,
structure, personnel and equipment requirements and
authorizations in an authorization document. These
documents are used at every level of command. At the
unit level, they are used as authority to requisition
personnel and equipment and to evaluate readiness. The
data in these documents are also used to manage
personnel and materiel procurement, force planning,
programming, budgeting, and training. [Ref. 15] The
Army maintains several systems to accomplish
documentation
.
(1) Force Accounting System (FAS) . HQDA
provides guidance on troop accounting and documentation
that directs specific force structure actions be
carried out within allocated manpower resources. Troop
lists for current, budget, and program years are
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provided from the Master Force (M-Force) maintained in
the Army's Force Accounting System (FAS). The M-Force
is the official statement of changes to unit structure
from the current year through the end of the POM. The
FAS is an automated management information system
containing data necessary for force structuring, force
planning, and accounting of all Army units. Serving as
the Army's official record of force structure
decisions, the FAS provides users with force planning
information. The system contains personnel strength
data by military identity (officer, warrant officer,
enlisted) and by civilian category (direct or indirect
hire). [Ref. 15]
(2) Command Plan . Twice a year, MACOMs
are required to develop a command plan reflecting how
HQDA force structure guidance will be implemented.
Several sources are used to prepare command plans.
These inputs include: the PBG; policies, goals, plans,
and other guidance continuously provided by HQDA; the
MACOM's current force structure; plans submitted by
subordinate organizations; earlier PARR submissions;
and results of MACOM analyses and decisions. [Ref. 15]
The command plan consists of troop
lists for current and projected forces, results of
executability analysis, and justification for deviation
from HQDA guidance. Command plans are submitted to
HQDA for review and approval. They are compared with
the M-Force and PBG to determine if they comply with
guidance. The command plans are used to update MACOM
force structure data in the FAS and, upon HQDA
approval , become the basis for MACOM unit
documentation. [Ref. 15]
( 3 ) The Army Authorization Documents
System ( TAADS )
.
Every Army unit has an authorization
document that reflects the organizational structure and
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resources and serves as the basis for requisitioning.
The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) is an
automated system that contains all unit authorization
documents; maintains quantitative and qualitative
personnel and equipment data; and interfaces with other
DA-automated systems, such as FAS.
There are two basic authorization
documents in the Army: Modification Tables of
Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Tables of
Distribution and Allowances ( TDA ) . The MTOE is a
modified version of a published TOE that prescribes the
mission, organizational structure, personnel, and
equipment necessary to perform a mission in a specific
geographic operational environment.
A TDA prescribes the organizational
structure, personnel, and equipment for a unit having a
support mission for which a TOE does not exist. TDA '
s
normally contain civilian positions and apply to
noncombat , nondeployable units. [Ref 16] Each TDA
document is command unique, usually representing
general support units. Approved MTOEs and TDAs are
documented in TAADS, which is used to update the M-
Force
.
(4) Structure and Composition System . The
Structure and Composition System (SACS) is a network of
computer programs that combines data from several
management information systems. SACS is used to
determine personnel and equipment requirements and
authorizations needed for a specific force structure
over a seven-year period (current, budget, and the
program years). The two components of the system are
the Personnel Structure and Composition System
( PERSACS ) and the Logistics Structure and Composition
System ( LOGSACS )
.
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PERSACS combines data from the M-
Force, TAADS and TOE Systems to determine military-
personnel requirements and authorizations by grade and
Military Occupational Specialty/Specialty Skill
Identifier (MOS/SSI). The personnel data are used for
recruiting, training, promoting, validating
requisitions, and distribution. LOGSACS combines data
from the M-Force, TAADS, TOE and other systems to state
equipment requirements and authorizations. LOGSACS is
used for procurement appropriations, equipment




The allocation function is accomplished
through the PBG. The HQDA PBG distributes Army
military and civilian manpower authorized spaces to
MACOMs and Operating Agencies for the current, budget,
and five program years. As stated earlier, the HQDA
PBG updates the manpower distribution three times a
year. MACOMs and agencies then suballocate the
manpower resources to subordinate echelons.
Authorizations are allocated against validated manpower
requirements
.
5 . Analysis and Evaluation
The last function listed in AR 570-4 is
analysis and evaluation. Missions, priorities,
guidance, constraints, and available resources must be
continuously analyzed and evaluated to make to proper
manpower assessments. In addition, analysts and
managers review TAADS documents and various actual
strength and budget performance reports to analyze and
evaluate manpower utilization and improve manpower
management credibility. Manpower utilization analysis
and evaluation programs include initiatives, such as:
(1) Continuing analysis to ensure that end-strength
ceilings are not exceeded on the last day of the
fiscal year.
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(2) Monitoring of overhire to ensure maximum use ofbudgeted personnel funds while retaining
flexibility to meet end-year personnel ceilings
without excessive personnel turbulence.
(3) Ensure that civilian manpower is used throughout
the year at levels that will preclude or
minimize the need for reduct ions-in-force
.
(4) Review of vacancies to determine if
authorizations should be reallocated to other
higher priority missions.
(5) Review of efficiency or cost effectivenessinitiatives to eliminate unnecessary manpower
requirements and to achieve the most efficient
use of funds.
(6) Monitoring workload trends to determine possible
reallocation of spaces. [Ref. 10: p. 31]
Manpower managers must continuously
coordinate with civilian personnel officers, position
management officers, and functional personnel to ensure
that position management efforts are fully supported.
In addition, resource managers must be informed of
anticipated manpower requirements and workloads so that
funds are made available to meet these manpower needs.
[Ref. 10:p. 31]
C . SUMMARY
The PPBES is the Army's primary strategic
management system used to allocate and manage
resources. In conjunction with the PPBES process, the
Manpower and Force Management Process plans, develops,
programs, and then implements the Army's force
structure. The interrelated phases of the PPBES and
the Force Management Process provide for an orderly
progression from national security objectives to
development of force requirements, establishment of
force structure and programs within resource
constraints, and to preparation, execution and review
of the budget. [Ref. 15:p. 14-1]
The goal of these processes is to ensure that the
program is developed and executed based on Army goals
and objectives designed to meet the demands of the
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national military strategy within available resources.
The formalized execution phase of the PPBES and the
Analysis and Evaluation function of manpower management
emphasize the Army's responsibility to effectively
evaluate and be accountable for the day-to-day
management of its resources. However, as discussed in
the next chapter, there are deficiencies in the PPBES
process that inhibit the Army's ability to ensure that
its resources are being effectively utilized.
The next chapter introduces OORMS as the Army's
proposed means for correcting the deficiencies in the
PPBES. The OORMS concept is explained in some detail
and an overview of the operational process is provided.
As a total resource system, OORMS has potential impact




V. OUTPUT ORIENTED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ( OORMS
)
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of OORMS is to meet a fundamental
requirement of Army resource management: feedback in
the PPBES. Specifically, OORMS is intended to provide
feedback on execution in terms of outputs achieved for
inputs planned, programmed, budgeted and then used.
The current resource management process does not
include this important link. With this essential
feedback, the Army can improve its ability to evaluate
how well Army programs are formulated and executed.
Information provided by OORMS will also improve the
quality of future decisions concerning Army programs
and alternatives.
B. THE OORMS CONCEPT
OORMS is a component of an overall concept
developed by the Army in 1984 to improve resource
management. At that time, the Army formally defined
the problems with the current PPBES process and
established a series of steps required to improve the
process. In order to understand the purpose of OORMS,
it is important to examine the total concept in which
OORMS plays a role.
The Army identified a basic problem in the PPBES:
the lack of a systematic feedback loop to determine how
well decisions made in the early phases actually turn
out. In the planning phase, The Army Plan is developed
by function. In the programming phase, resources are
programmed to support specific missions and initiatives
within each of the functions. The transition from
planning to programming involves a translation of
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overall functions into a presentation of missions
within each function in the form of PDIPs. [Ref. 17]
The move from programming to budgeting and
execution changes the focus from the horizontal
structure of resources across program packages to the
vertical structure of resources in strict
appropriations. The appropriation structure is
necessary in the presentation of the budget to
Congress. This structure is also used to distribute
approved funds to Army organizations and to report back
actual program execution.
Although the Congressional requirement of budgeting
by appropriation is unavoidable, the transition from
program packages to appropriation has caused a
disconnect in the PPBES process. This change in
resource structure causes problems in establishing a
meaningful feedback loop that expresses execution in
the same terms as planning and programming. The Army
has recently recognized the need to modify the PPBES
process to retain both horizontal and vertical
management visibility throughout all phases of the
PPBES.
To accomplish this modification, the Army is
designing a major revision to the currently
appropriation-oriented Army Management Structure ( AMS
)
[Ref. 17:p. 3]. The redesigned AMS will consist of
modular components with standard coding structures that
can be used in a data base management environment [Ref.
18:p. 3]. This new structure will allow resources to
be tracked both to horizontally and vertically
throughout the PPBES process.
However, the AMS redesign is not expected to be
fully implemented until the 1990s. In the meantime,
the Army has begun a series of six steps to close the
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loop in the current system. OORMS plays a key role in
this scenario.
1 . Establish a Logical Program Package Structure
The first step is to establish a logical
program package structure to accommodate both the
external requirements of the PPBES process and the way
that the Army operates [Ref. 12]. The package
structure must also be meaningful to programmers,
budgeters, and those who execute the programs. Figure
5.1 illustrates the new Standard Army Management
Structure (SAMS).
a. Battalion Level Structure
The core of the structure is the Standard
Requirements Code (SRC) level on the battalion level
force structure of the Army. This where the soldiers
and weapons are actually deployed.
b. TOE Mission
Based on the TAA decisions, the TOE
structure is built to higher level units (e.g.,
divisions, separate brigades, combat support and combat
service support units). This should be done in terms
of both wartime corps commands and peacetime management
support channel units.
c. Weapons Acquisition and Fielding
Once the TOE MDEP network has been created,
the Army must assess the capability of weapons systems
on hand and scheduled for procurement to support that
structure. These weapons MDEPs will include the
resources associated with the development, production,
facility construction, and fielding of major systems.
d. TDA Missions
TDA mission activities support the Total
Army and include such functions as recruiting,
enlistment processing, training, logistics support, and




Figure 5.1 The Standard Army Management Structure(SAMS) (Ref. 19)
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recurring TDA activities and form meaningful program
packages
.
e. Standard Installation Operations (SIO)
The operating requirements of garrisons,
communities and installations must be separately
addressed. These activities provide support to
assigned military personnel, nearby retirees, eligible
family members, and DA civilians. All resources for a
function in the Army will eventually be in the same
MDEP.
2 . Establish Output/Performance Measures
The second step involves the identification of
workload inputs and outputs to support resources in the
PDIPs. The Army needs to define performance factors,
workloads, inputs, and outputs for its resource
packages. It is necessary to specify what the resources
are supposed to produce. Without this information, the
Army can not establish accountability of its programs
or evaluate program execution. The Army decision
making process must become output-oriented. [Ref. 12]
3. Expand the Time Frame
The third major step requires the expansion of
the five year PDIP to the full eight year period of the
PPBES by adding the prior, current, and budget year
[Ref. 12] This extension must be made with the
understanding that the Army does not have the same
freedom to change resources in the budget and current
years as in the program years. Although there are
distinct control differences between program and budget
periods, the PPBES program package must carry into
budget and execution.
The Army's tool to bridge the two periods is the
MDEP. As previously discussed, the MDEP is a linkup of
the programmer's PDIP and the budgeter's BIP. As the
common denominator for programming, budgeting, and
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execution, the MDEP is the key element in establishing
a feedback loop for decision makers.
4 . Adapt the Army Accounting Systems
The fourth step requires the adaptation of Army
accounting systems to provide feedback on program
performance on execution. The MDEP identifier must be
added to fund citations and accounting system master
files. This will provide the capability to extract
financial and performance feedback information by
programming package. In addition, the Army plans to
integrate information from the operating systems (e.g.,
training, logistics, readiness) into the process. [Ref.
12] With both operational and financial data, there
will be a more comprehensive picture of program
accompl ishment
.
5 . Modify the Program and Budget Development
Process
The fifth step is to develop a "user friendly"
automated program and budget development process that
would be used at all levels. This system would provide
the capability to manage resources by both program
package and appropriation. It would include standard
data displays using standard software on microcomputers
to pass data on MDEP resources and outputs between
levels of command. The system will also include some
analytical capability to help managers evaluate
programs and identify problems. [Ref. 12]
6. Link to Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD)
The last step requires that these initiatives
be linked to Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD)
efforts. DOCMOD is a modernization program for the
Army's management systems, including its doctrine,
practices, and procedures. [Ref. 20:p. 17] This link
will ensure that the PPBES processes and resource
packages are consistent with the decision packages that
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determine force structure, equipment procurement, and
fielding and operational support decisions [Ref. 12:p.
10].
Once the six steps described above are
accomplished, OORMS will provide the means for
accumulating the data to support resource management
information needs. Essentially, OORMS is an
integrating mechanism, supplying the automation support
necessary to effectively use the newly structured
resource management concept. It will produce the data
needed by managers to make better decisions.
C. THE OORMS OPERATIONAL PROCESS
1. Basic Elements of OORMS
There are two basic elements of OORMS. The
first is the Management Decision Package (MDEP)--the
principal building block of the OORMS system. The core
elements of the MDEP include eight years of dollar and
manpower resource inputs and the quantitative measures
of the expected outputs given these inputs. MDEPs fall
primarily into five categories: TOE, TDA , SIO, weapons
systems, and special functional packages. Figure 5.2
illustrates how the MDEP is integrated in OORMS.
The second principal element of OORMS is the
Resource Package. The Resource Package is the means
for transmitting guidance (dollars, manpower, and
output) by MDEP from HQDA to MACOMs and then to MSCs
and installations. It will also be used to transmit
responses, unresourced requirements, and execution data
back up the chain of command. The basic package
contains a Resource Data Worksheet (RDW), an audit
trail, and a remarks file. [Ref. 21]
The main component of the Resource Package is
the RDW, an automated spreadsheet. The RDW originating
at HQDA will contain budget data for the current year,
budget year, and five program years. Responses to the
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guidance, unresourced requirements, and execution data
will be added to the worksheet by MACOMs , MSCs, and
installations. When completed, the RDW (Figure 5.3)
will reflect budget, funding, authority, and execution
data for the prior and current years and guidance and
response data for the budget years and five program
years. [Ref. 21:p. II-5]
The audit trail in the Resource Package will be
used to track changes to RDWs . The remarks file will
contain MDEP-specif ic remarks and point-of-contact
information. The RDW, audit trail, and remarks file
will be maintained in separate files.
2 . The Operational Cycle
There are two principal cycles in the OORMS
process: distribution and response. During the
distribution cycle, program and budget guidance and
controls are issued by HQDA to the MACOMs /Operating
Agencies and then distributed to MSCs and
installations. On the response cycle, execution plans,
execution reports, and COB Schedules are prepared and
transmitted back up the chain of command.
3. Levels of Operation
OORMS has been designed to operate at three
principal levels of command: HQDA, MACOM/Operat ing
Agency, and installation. At the HQDA level, the Army
staff will manage the programming and budgeting of
aggregated MDEPs within OORMS. HQDA will issue
guidance to MACOMs to allocate resources in support of
each MDEP. However, the OORMS RDW will replace the PBG
as the vehicle for publishing this guidance to MACOMs
[Ref. 21:p. III-3]. RDW releases will coincide with
the current schedule of PBG releases.
HQDA will collect the MACOMs' responses to the
guidance as the RDWs are returned in support of COB
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Figure 5.3 The Resource Data Worksheet (RDW) (Ref. 22)
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resourced requirements, new initiatives, and current
execution data will be displayed against the HQDA-
issued MDEP guidance on the RDW. HQDA will use this
information, along with the PARRs and COBs , to prepare
the next major program and budget submissions,
execution plan, and the next round of guidance.
At the MACOM level, the resource manager is
responsible for distributing the guidance received from
HQDA to subordinate MSCs and installations. Using
decision support software provided by OORMS , MACOMs
will transform MACOM-level RDWs from HQDA into
installation-level RDWs [Ref 21:p. III-ll]. The
apportioned RDWs will then be distributed to the
MACOMs' subordinate MSCs/ installations along with the
rest of the Resource Package.
The Resource Packages are returned to the
MACOMs from the MSCs/ installations in support of COB or
execution plan preparation. Two types of data will be
added to the RDW by MSCs/ installations : responses to
program and budget guidance and current year data. The
MSC/ installation RDW responses will be used by the
MACOMs to realign the guidance they sent down. The
execution data are used for comparison against previous
and current guidance for the current fiscal year.
MSC/ installation responses and MACOM realignments of
resources are then used to prepare the Resource Package
response to HQDA.
At the MSC/ installation level, the resource
manager receives guidance in the RDW included in the
Resource Package from the MACOM. A procedure analogous
to that used by MACOMs is followed to distribute the
guidance to subordinate organizations. Similarly,
resourced and unresourced requirements as well as
execution data are arrayed against the issued guidance
and returned to the MACOM. OORMS is currently designed
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to function down to the installation level only.
However, the MSCs/ instal lat ions could conceivably
extend the process further based on local requirements.
[Ref 13:p. 4-19]
4 . System Applications
OORMS was originally expected to be used to
transmit program and budget data, support PARR and COB
preparation, submit execution plans, and support
special resource management issues [Ref. 21:p. II-7].
During FY87 , the first year of OORMS operations, OORMS
software will be used to forward program and budget
guidance and to prepare COB Schedules 1 (Unresourced
Requirements/Excess Funds) and 8 (Command Requested
Changes). Furthermore, installations will prepare an
execution plan and execution reports by MDEP . [Ref. 23]
In addition to these specific applications,
OORMS data can be used for various analyses. The first
type is trend analysis within an MDEP over a number of
years. This can be done by both MDEP and program
element ( PE ) . With the output measures, analysts will
be able to see what has happened to a specific MDEP
historically and in the program and budget years.
[Ref. 22]
OORMS will also be useful in execution analyses.
By preparing an execution plan, installations will have
a base against which actual execution can be measured.
If actual outputs are less than planned, then actual
expenditure of resources should also be lower. If
execution data show otherwise, analysts must determine
the reasons for this unexpected relationship between
resource consumption and corresponding outputs. Again,
this analysis can be done by MDEP or PE
.
A third possible analysis is determining the
cost of doing business in terms of resources needed to
produce output objectives. By using output measures
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provided by OORMS, analysts can evaluate program
objectives, resource requirements, required outputs,
and the effects of shortfalls [Ref 22:p. 24]. OORMS
data can provide the necessary information to determine
what it takes to perform an installation's or other
organization's missions.
Finally, output performance analysis can be
performed with the inclusion of output measures in
OORMS. When resources are increased or decreased in a
given program, the corresponding expected outputs can
be adjusted. Furthermore, given the expected
constraints on resources, output performance analysis
should provide the basis for program formulation and
defense. [Ref. 22:p. 25]
5 . System Data
The OORMS process was designed to access
several existing databases for guidance, execution, and
output data. The HQDA PROBE database will be the
original source for resource guidance. At the
installations, the Army's Standard Finance System
(STANFINS) will be the primary source for dollar
resource execution data. Execution reporting of
manpower utilization by MDEP and PE was expected to
require interface with several different systems and
likely generate new reporting requirements [Ref. 21 :p.
11-51]. It was anticipated that the Standard
Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) and
TAADS could provide military personnel data and the
Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information
System (SCIPMIS) could be used for civilians. The
source for output data would be primarily new since




6. Level of Detail
Each level of command has different
requirements for level of detail in the data. In
OORMS, the level of detail is changed during the
process of distributing the resources. Since HQDA
requires the least amount of detail, the guidance
originates in its most general form. As the guidance
is distributed by MACOMs to MSCs/ instal lations , further
detail is added (e.g., station, Element of Resource).
Conversely, during the response cycle, the execution
data are rolled up to more summarized form for
transmittal up the chain of command.
7. OORMS Hardware and Software
OORMS has been designed to use hardware and
software that is widely available and standard to
resource managers. The specific system configuration
is as follows:
(1) An IBM-PC compatible or WANG microcomputer--wi th512K internal memory and a 10 megabyte hard disk
(2) A disk operating system--DOS 2.1 or higher
(3) A spreadsheet software package--LOTUS 1-2-3
release 1A or higher
(4) OORMS System Software, Version 1 . or higher
(5) A database management system--dBASEI I
I
(6) A wide-carriage printer. [Ref. 13:p. 4-21]
OORMS is intended to interface with existing resource
management and reporting systems at HQDA, MACOM, and
installation levels. However, the responsibility has
been placed on the organizations involved to ensure
that the interfaces are accomplished properly.
D . SUMMARY
OORMS implements a new approach to Army resource
management. It is expected to provide the means for
tracking resources in standard terms from Army
programming, through budgeting and then execution.
OORMS was developed in response to a need for a
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systematic feedback loop in the PPBES process. The
ultimate objective is to provide managers with more
meaningful information to evaluate program execution
and improve resource allocation decisions.
The next chapter focuses on the impact of OORMS on
manpower and force management. To help evaluate the
overall effects of OORMS, the system will be analyzed
in terms of how it will affect each manpower management
function. In addition, a discussion is provided on the
current status of OORMS and manpower management's role
in determining its future.
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VI. IMPACT OF OORMS ON MANPOWER MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
AR 570-4, Manpower Management
, states that OORMS
"...will simplify and expedite both the preparation of
the COB/PARR and the distribution, analysis and
forwarding to HQDA of data indicative of the
performance and execution of existing programs and
budgets." Furthermore, OORMS is expected to
"...involve the distributive processes of manpower
management (planning, programming, budgeting, and
allocation) and because of its emphasis on performance
measures, the manpower requirements determination
process." [Ref. 10:p. 5] To evaluate the potential
impact on manpower management, it is necessary to




As previously discussed, the Army has been
criticized for its inadequate requirements
determination process. In response to this criticism,
the Army has taken action to improve this process
through the development of MS-3 and MARC. The goal is
to establish a credible requirements determination
system that can be used to determine future manpower
needs and is compatible with PPBES formats.
OORMS promises to support the requirements
determination process by providing the key element of
outputs achieved for resources used. The output
measures are expected to vary in level of detail at
each organizational level. Installations will need the
most detailed information, while HQDA will require the
least detail. Furthermore, under the OORMS concept,
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the basic characteristics of output measures include
the following:
(1) Measures must belong to a hierarchy that islogical from bottom to top.
(2) Measures must be meaningful to the resource
manager or decision maker at each level.
(3) Measures must be at the appropriate level ofdetail and specificity.
(4) Measures must be linked to activities /functions
with high visibility and with high payoffs.
(5) Measures must be easily quantified and obtained.[Ref. 21:p. D-2]
The Army Materiel Command has developed a concept
that would include two levels of input/output measures.
Performance factors or workload indicators would be
used to support the micro level (e.g., program element
or the specific account within a system or program)
while input/output measures would justify the macro
level (i.e., total weapon system or program level).
Since both levels of detail are needed, depending on
the organizational level of the user, both micro
performance factors and macro input/output measures
would be included for each MDEP . [Ref. 24]
Ideally, output measures would be related to the
Army's ultimate goal--ready units for prompt and
sustained combat. However, readiness in national
defense is hard to quantify and measure. Conceptually,
the most feasible way of quantifying a nonmeasurable
goal (e.g., defense by deterrence) is to find certain
measurable results (performance-oriented) or processes
that are correlated with the desired outputs. [Ref.
25:p. 140] These proxies can serve as quantitative
links to defense outputs and can provide a means for
evaluating achievement of Army goals.
Although the concept of output measures is sound in
theory, it has proven to be the weakest link in OORMS
development. Some Army activities and functions lend
themselves readily to input/output formulation; others
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do not. For example, many of the activities within the
SIO can be addressed on the basis of population served.
The personnel training function can be evaluated based
on student loads needed to meet annual force structure
requirements. Recruitment may be measured in terms of
the service entrants necessary to fill the force
requirements. [Ref. 22 :p. 25] However, for many Army
functions, the identifying and quantifying of desired
output is very difficult.
The Army is currently trying to develop a
methodology for establishing output measures for base
operations functions. To date, the process has not
progressed past the theoretical stage. The goal is to
develop measures that have the basic characteristics
discussed above, but this has proven to be very
difficult. [Ref. 26]
Proponents for OORMS output measures are trying to
use what is already available in order to avoid
unnecessary work. Sources include MS-3 efforts, Army
contracts, and various Army functional reports. The
problem is that many of the performance factors
traditionally associated with base operations functions
really measure the process, rather than the output.
[Ref. 26] Since the Army is not confident that these
measures proxy "desired output" adequately, they are of
questionable value.
MACOMs have also been involved in output measure
development by addressing their respective MACOM-unique
MDEPs. Again, there has been little success in this
exercise. One MACOM even had a contractor assigned to
the project. However, eventually the contractor gave
up; the task proved to be too difficult. [Ref. 27]
Without these critical output measures, OORMS will
do little to support requirements determination. In
fact, the system as it is currently designed does not
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even include manpower requirements. It appears that
OORMS may not provide anything to manpower managers to
help perform requirements determination.
C. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING
Since OORMS was developed to enhance the PPBES
process, it should impact on manpower management's
planning, programming, and budgeting function.
Planning includes structuring of Army forces to meet
national strategic goals. Programming involves the
development and documentation of manpower needs in the
FYDP . Revisions are frequently made in response to
changes in Army or DOD guidance or national priorities.
During budgeting, manpower requirements are translated
into requests for end strength authorizations.
To a large extent, the planning, programming, and
budgeting function is dependent on the quality of the
requirements determination function. The accuracy of
the manpower resource needs reflected in the FYDP and
budget requests is affected by the credibility of the
manpower requirements program. Therefore, the impact
of OORMS on the quality of manpower data in the
planning, programming, and budgeting process is related
to the effects of OORMS on requirements. As previously
discussed, the current status of OORMS does not offer
much support to manpower requirements programs.
OORMS is expected, however, to affect the process
used to transmit program and budget data and PARR and
COB preparation. Of course, to date it seems that the
effects are quite limited. During FY87 , OORMS was used
to forward program and budget guidance and only a
portion of the COB. Furthermore, the COB doesn't cover
RDTE
,
procurement or military appropriations.
For manpower, OORMS was even less useful during
FY87 since manpower workyear guidance and end strength
figures were omitted for some Army organizations.
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Overall, OORMS provided little change in the planning,
programming, and budgeting process for manpower.
[Ref. 28]
D. DOCUMENTATION
Documentation in manpower management currently
involves numerous automated systems, including TAADS
,
FAS, and SACS. OORMS will not replace any of these
systems, although there are studies currently ongoing
to determine the feasibility of OORMS interfacing with
one or more of them. It is important that the manpower
data in OORMS are consistent with that in other
manpower systems. OORMS ' s effect on manpower
documentation depends on whether the necessary
interfaces can be created. The OORMS system, as
currently designed, will not affect manpower
documentation processes.
E. ALLOCATION
Allocation of manpower is accomplished by the PBG.
The PBG is published by HQDA three times a year to
update the distribution of Army military and civilian
manpower authorizations. In addition to these cyclical
updates, HQDA and MACOMS often issue inter-cycle
changes via letter or message, as the need arises.
OORMS is supposed to replace the PBG as the way to
communicate or allocate resource decisions to MACOMs
and installations. The current plan is to continue to
issue updates to allocations three times a year. To be
responsive to manpower management needs, OORMS must
also be able to accommodate inter-cycle updates. The
system software is expected to provide this capability
[Ref. 29].
The institution of MDEPs has led to the need to
allocate manpower by an additional category--MDEP . The
inclusion of MDEPS in allocation has caused some
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problems for manpower managers. As part of the
transition to the new concept of managing resources by
MDEP , MACOMs have modified the format of their PBGs to
include the MDEP. As a result, the PBG has grown to an
unmanageable size. The complete document now produces
stacks of paper several feet high. A document that
size is excessively cumbersome for MACOMs that update
the PBG for their subordinate organizations on a
quarterly and sometimes monthly basis. [Ref. 27]
This volume of data has been very difficult to
manage. Many of the MDEPs do not easily roll up to
meaningful packages that MACOMs need for analysis.
Furthermore, the Army is still required to manage
resources by appropriation to meet outside reporting
requirements. Therefore, the PBG must continue to
allocate manpower by Army Management Structure code
(AMSCO) as well as numerous other data elements (e.g.,
fiscal year, command, personnel type, military by
grade, etc.). The result is that the PBG now contains
excessive detail that undermines its usefulness.
One of the objectives of OORMS is to provide more
time for analysis and review through the reduction in
preparation time. However, it appears that any time
savings produced by OORMS automation initiatives will
be more than overcome by increased manhours needed to
decipher an unmanageable volume of data. To be
supportive of manpower management allocation, OORMS
must provide data at the appropriate level of detail to
facilitate interpretation and analysis.
F. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
The analysis and evaluation function involves the
assessment of manpower programs given the missions,
guidance, constraints, and available resources. One of
the most important components is the review and
analysis of manpower utilization data. Analysts and
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managers use these data to evaluate how well manpower
resources are being utilized to accomplish assigned
workloads or programs.
One of the primary benefits to be provided by OORMS
is timely execution data (dollars, manpower and
outputs). Manpower managers would certainly benefit
from useful manpower data, particularly if they were
accompanied by the associated output produced. Most of
the utilization data currently available are of limited
value to manpower analysts, particularly at the
installation level. As previously discussed, the
utilization reports are too complicated and lengthy.
Furthermore, there has been a history of redundant
manpower reporting, as similar data appear on several
reports
.
Although OORMS promises to provide the manpower
data needed, the system is currently not delivering
what was expected. To begin with, there are no output
measures and therefore, no output accomplishment data.
Furthermore, execution reports either have omitted
civilian and military end strength figures or included
numbers that were not in line with manpower reporting
[Ref. 30]. One problem is that the data are extracted
from finance and accounting systems that report by pay
periods. Manpower reports require end strength figures
as of the end of the month which usually does not
coincide with pay periods. As a result, the manpower
data produced in OORMS are inaccurate and unreliable
for manpower management purposes.
Several other problems have persisted with the
execution reports. Finance and accounting systems
manage by operating agency while manpower reports
require the data by Unit Identification Code (UIC) or
MSC and separate reporting activity. Therefore, the
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data in OORMS were In a format that was inconsistent
with manpower reporting needs. [Ref. 31]
This problem was worsened by the fact that most
installation execution reports are transferred up
finance and accounting channels, bypassing installation
manpower organizations. The data are often not
reviewed for validity until they reach the MACOM.
Also, as with the PBG, it is difficult and time
consuming to analyze the execution reports given their
extensive MDEP detail. Since the execution report does
not replace any of the currently required manpower
reports, this is additional workload for manpower
analysts
.
Many of the current problems with the execution
reports are likely due to the fact that OORMS is new
and still being refined. The operating procedures and
data consistency problems may be worked out as manpower
management needs are better defined and communicated.
As it currently stands, OORMS does not help manpower
managers perform analysis and evaluation. Rather, it
creates an additional workload burden.
G. CURRENT STATUS OF OORMS
It is apparent that OORMS cannot support manpower
management as it currently operates. The manpower data
in the system are either incomplete, inconsistent, or
in a format that is inappropriate for manpower
reporting and analysis. Furthermore, the addition of
MDEPs has caused key manpower documents (PBG and
execution report) to expand to an unmanageable size.
Army-wide, there are over 1000 MDEPs [Ref. 32]. An
individual MACOM may have resources assigned to several
hundred of these. To manage by MDEP, in addition to
the traditional categories (e.g., AMSCO and UIC) will
likely cause an expanded workload.
77
The Army Staff is currently studying OORMS to
determine its future. A task force was established in
late FY87 to review all aspects the system (including
manpower) to identify its deficiencies and determine
whether it can still meet its original objectives. The
task force is expected to report its findings by
February 1988.
[Ref. 33]
Army manpower management is represented on the task
force and is in the process of defining manpower needs
from OORMS. It is apparent that manpower was neglected
in the process of designing and implementing the system
to this point. There has been little or no
documentation or correspondence on the issue of
manpower in OORMS. The matter has just recently
received sufficient attention of manpower managers and
OORMS developers to prompt some action.
The key issue to be addressed is the interface of
OORMS with other manpower systems [Ref. 34]. Even
before OORMS, there has been a persistent problem with
discrepancies between manpower data in FAS and the PBG
[Ref. 35]. The major problem seems to be
inconsistencies in data elements within the two
systems. To eliminate the problem of duplicate and
inconsistent guidance, manpower analysts on the Army
staff have recommended that the FAS be the official
data source for manpower allocations instead of the PBG
[Ref. 36].
Once the manpower community agrees on the official
source for manpower guidance, OORMS must be capable of
handling manpower data in a compatible format and level
of detail. If FAS is the manpower data source, OORMS
must include manpower strengths by FY, MDEP , UIC, and
AMSCO [Ref. 37]. However, OORMS currently does not
have the capability to handle manpower by UIC and may
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never have it. There has been some question as to
whether PCs would be able to handle the added volume of
data resulting from the inclusion of UIC level detail
[Ref. 38].
This issue must be satisfactorily resolved if OORMS
is to be of any benefit to manpower. The system must
provide the data at the same level of detail and in the
same format that the manpower community is required to
manage by. Otherwise, it is likely that the manpower
community will have to maintain redundant systems--
OORMS and the current systems.
Without output measures and appropriate manpower
data, OORMS will be of limited value and the system
requirements will create an unnecessary additional
workload. This outcome must be avoided if OORMS is
going to be supportive, rather than counter-productive,
to manpower management.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The goals of this thesis are to determine the
relationship of OORMS to the PPBES and manpower
management systems, and to evaluate the impact of OORMS
on manpower management in terms of the quality and
usefulness of the information provided and the
workload required of manpower staffs to support the
system.
A literature review identified some important
issues in current Army PPBES and manpower management
systems. Historically, the Army has been criticized
for the deficiencies in its systems for managing
financial and manpower resources. In particular, GAO
has cited the Army for the lack of credibility in its
system for determining manpower requirements and for
its inability to provide reliable, consistent data on
actual accomplishments during the execution of its
programs
.
The PPBES is the primary management system used by
the Army to allocate and manage resources. Within the
PPBES process, the Manpower and Force Management
Process plans, develops, and then implements the Army's
force structure. Both systems are structured to
accommodate a logical progression of activities that
start with the identification of national military
strategy and end with the execution of programs
designed to meet these national objectives.
Although the execution phase of the PPBES
emphasizes the importance of evaluating program
accomplishments, the actual PPBES process is deficient
in providing the information needed to assess program
execution. To correct this deficiency, the Army
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developed the OORMS concept to improve the linkage
between plans, programs, budgets, and executions.
OORMS is intended to produce feedback on execution in
terms of outputs achieved for inputs assigned in the
PPBES.
OORMS is expected to provide the means for tracking
resources in standard terms from Army programming,
through budgeting and then execution. This will be
accomplished through use of the MDEP as the common
denominator for identifying resources throughout the
PPBES cycle. OORMS is the integrating mechanism that
supplies the automation support necessary to produce
the data needed by managers to evaluate program
execution
.
AR 570-4, Manpower Management , indicates that OORMS
will affect manpower management in its planning,
programming and budgeting function, allocation
function, and requirements determination function.
OORMS is also supposed to enhance the analysis of data
indicative of program performance and execution. An
analysis of the affects of OORMS on each manpower
management function provides an indication of the
overall impact of the system.
By providing data on outputs produced with given
levels of manpower inputs, OORMS could support the
requirements determination function. These data would
be useful to help the Army overcome the deficiencies
identified by GAO in the requirements function. To
date, however, there has been little progress made in
the development of output measures. Of crucial
importance, the system does not even include manpower
requirements. Without output measures, OORMS offers
little support to requirements determination.
OORMS was originally designed to affect the
planning programming, and budgeting function by
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transmitting program and budget data and portions of
the PARR and COB. However, the effects will be limited
since OORMS only covers portions of these documents.
Furthermore, FY87 OORMS program and budget guidance
omitted essential manpower data.
OORMS is not expected to affect the documentation
function. It will not replace any of the manpower
systems currently supporting documentation. The
primary issue to be resolved is the interface of OORMS
with these systems.
The allocation function will be affected by OORMS
if it replaces the PBG as the means for transmitting
resource decisions. However, adding the MDEP to the
allocation process could lead to an unmanageable volume
of data in the guidance document. The result may be
increased workload for manpower managers in performing
the allocation function.
OORMS offers the potential to improve manpower
analysis and evaluation by providing meaningful and
timely execution data. However, the execution data
currently produced in OORMS are of little value to
manpower analysts. The data are incomplete,
inconsistent, or presented in a format that is
incompatible with manpower management needs.
Furthermore, the reporting requirements of OORMS
currently represent an added workload and duplication
of effort.
Overall, it is clear that OORMS as currently
developed does not support manpower management. The
OORMS concept is sound and has the potential to enhance
manpower management, particularly the requirements
determination function. In practice, however, OORMS
has many deficiencies that prevent it from providing
benefits to manpower analysts. The ultimate impact of
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For manpower managers, the goal is to have OORMS
provide consistent, timely data that are at the
appropriate level of detail, without causing
duplication of effort or added workload. To help
achieve this goal the following recommendations are
provided
:
(1) Before OORMS can support the manpower community,
manpower managers must determine their
requirements and articulate them in writing. As
a part of this effort, all current manpower
reports and systems should be reviewed for
usefulness and consistency. Data requirements
should be consistent with manpower regulations.
Once the current manpower reporting systems are
made consistent, OORMS data should be structured
in a compatible format.
(2) To ensure that the needs of each organizational
level are met, representatives from MACOMs
,
MSCs, and installations should be involved in the
identification of manpower needs. Furthermore,
each organizational level should be represented
in each phase of OORMS implementation to provide
feedback on the impact of the system. The
usefulness of OORMS should be evaluated for all
levels in the organization, not just at HQDA.
(3) Efforts on the development of output measures
should be accelerated. They are the key to the
success of OORMS. Without these critical
measures, OORMS cannot provide the feedback
needed to evaluate program execution.
(4) OORMS proponents should ensure that information
and progress reports on OORMS are provided to all
resource management organizations down through
the installation level. The OORMS concept has
not been promoted very well at installations,
particularly in manpower organizations. Resource
managers are more likely to be receptive to new
systems if they have been involved, or at least
informed, from the beginning.
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(5) The framework and criteria developed in this
thesis are useful for assessing the effects of
OORMS on manpower management. As the system is
further developed, modified, and implemented, it
must be evaluated in terms of its impact on all




ALLOCATION - Process of distributing authorizations to
subordinate echelons.
COMMAND PLAN - Report submitted to HQDA by a MACOM or
selected operating agency which reflects the current
and future force structure and manpower distribution.
FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM ( FYDP ) - Specifies the force
levels in terms of major mission programs and support
objectives and projects. The FYDP constitutes the
official summary of programs approved by the Secretary
of Defense.
FORCE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (FAS) - An automated system
used to account for both actual and planned force
structure actions over time. It includes the Master-
Force which is the official Army troop list, including
all units in the force structure for all years.
INPUT - A measure of the resources consumed (or used)
by an organization during the process(es) of meeting
its assigned responsibilities.
MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS - That portion of required
manpower which is available for allocation and is
reflected in the authorized columns of current or
projected authorization documents. Because of budget
constraints, authorized manpower is normally less than
required manpower.
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS - Human resources needed to
accomplish specified workloads of organizations.
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS CRITERIA (MARC) - HQDA approved
standards for determining minimum essential wartime
position requirements for combat support and combat
service support functions In TOE/MTOE.
MANPOWER STAFFING STANDARDS SYSTEM (MS-3) - A manpower
requirements determination approach based on workload-
driven and functionally oriented standards.
MASTER FORCE (M-FORCE) - The authoritative record at
HQDA of Army units and military/civilian manpower
structure strength and authorized strength (required
and authorized columns of MTOE/TDA) programmed for the
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current and budget fiscal years and all subsequent
years for which data exists.
MINIMUM RISK FORCE (MRF) - A fully structured and
supported force that is unconstrained by manpower or
support resources. The MRF identifies the force
capabilities required to provide a high assurance of
successfully executing the national military strategy.
MODIFICATION TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
(MTOE) - A modified version of a published TOE which
prescribes the normal mission, organizational
structure, personnel and equipment requirements for a
military unit. It reflects the specific needs of a
unit for mission performance in a specific geographical
environment
.
OBJECTIVE FORCE - A force which focuses on the year of
the current POM that is used as a realistic goal in the
subsequent development of the program force. The
objective force has more constraints applied to it than
either the minimum risk force or the planning force.
The objective force is a macro level (division) look at
the forces required to meet specific objectives.
OUTPUT - A measure of the aggregate total of all the
products or services provided by an organization.
Organizations with multiple functions or missions may
have more than one product or output measure.
PLANNING FORCE - A fully structured and supported force
that imposes additional constraints on the minimum risk
force in an effort to achieve a more affordable and
realistic force, capable of achieving the national
objectives but with some inherent level of risk.
PROGRAM AND BUDGET GUIDANCE ( PBG ) - A document issued
by HQDA to convey to commands and agencies the
objectives, policies, standards, support services,
obligation estimates, and broad goals that have been
approved to meet requirements generated by national
military strategy. It provides military and civilian
allocations for current, budget, and all program fiscal
years
.
PROGRAMMING FORCE - The tactical support forces and
general support forces necessary to support the
divisional and nondivisional combat forces contained in
the objective force. The programming force is used to
support the Army POM.
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PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM (POM) - Submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense in May of each year,
it formally transmits the Army proposals for resource
allocation in consonance with program guidance.
Describes all aspects of Army programs to increase the
operational readiness of the total Army. It highlights
forces, manpower, and materiel acquisition.
STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION SYSTEM (SACS) - An automated
process which determines requirements/authorizations
for personnel by grade, branch, and military
occupational specialty and for equipment by line item
number
.
TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES ( TDA ) - An
authorization document which prescribes the
organizational structure for a units having a support
mission for which a TOE does not exist and which
normally contains civilian positions. This document
applies to noncombat , nondeployable units.
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TOE) - A table
which prescribes the method by which mission,
organizational structure, personnel and equipment
requirements for deployable combat, combat support, and
combat service support units are structured and
documented, and is the basis for structuring MTOE
units
.
THE ARMY AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENTS SYSTEM ( TAADS ) - An
automated system that supports the development and
documentation of organizational structures, and the
requirements for authorizations of personnel and







AMS Army Management Structure
AMSCO Army Management Structure Code
B
BES Budget Estimates Submission
BIP Budget Increment Package
C
COB Command Operating Budget
CONUS Continental United States




DOD Department of Defense
DRB Defense Resources Board
E
EPA Extended Planning Annex
F
FAS Force Accounting System
FY Fiscal Year
FYDP Five Year Defense Program
J
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPAM Joint Program Assessment
Memorandum
JSPD Joint Strategic Planning
Document
L
LOGSACS Logistics Structure and
Composition System





MARC Manpower Requirements Criteria
MDEP Management Decision Package
M-FORCE Master-Force
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
MRF Minimum Risk Force
MRIS Modernization Resource
Information Submission
MSC Major Subordinate Command
MS-3 Manpower Staffing Standards
System
MTOE Modification Tables of
Organization and Equipment
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OORMS Output Oriented Resource
Management System
OSD Office of the Secretary of
Defense
P
PARR Program Analysis Resource Review
PBD Program Budget Decision
PBG Program and Budget Guidance
PDIP Program Development Increment
Package
PDM Program Decision Memorandum
PE Program Element
PERSACS Personnel Structure and
Composition System
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PPBERS Program Performance and Budget
Execution Review System
PPBES Planning, Programming.
Budgeting, and Execution System
PPBS Planning. Programming, and
Budgeting System
PROBE Program Optimization and Budget
Evaluation
R
RDTE Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation
RDW Resource Data Worksheet
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sSA Secretary of the Army
SACS Structure and Composition System
SAMS Standard Army Management
Structure
SCIPMIS Standard Civilian Personnel
Management Information System
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SIDPERS Standard Installation/Division
Personnel System
SIO Standard Installation Operations
SRC Standard Requirements Code
SSI Specialty Skill Identifier
STANFINS Standard Finance System
T
TAA Total Army Analysis
TAADS The Army Authorization Documents
System
TAP The Army Plan
TDA Tables of Distribution and
Allowances
TOE Tables of Organization and
Equipment
U
UIC Unit Identification Code
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